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INTRODUCTION:
The impetus for this project came when I stumbled on a description of the International
Opium Commission’s 1909 meeting while doing unrelated research. The meeting, held in
Shanghai at the behest of the United States, united consumers of opium with major producers
with an eye to banning opium trade and production. The Commission and its subsequent
international Conferences paved the way to what is the status quo regarding the legality of
narcotics in our world today, as most narcotic substances are illegal in most states. The
Ottomans, however, did not attend any of these conferences, which seemed unusual given that
they were invited, that they controlled a vast amount of agricultural land suitable for the
cultivation of papaver somniferum, the opium poppy, and that more minor opium-producing
countries such as Persia and Siam did attend the conference. In exploring the reason for the
Ottomans’ absence, I learned, to my chagrin, that the answer to the Ottoman absence from the
Commission and the Conference was fairly uninteresting, unambiguous, and not particularly
suitable for a thesis—opium production was too important for the finances of the Ottoman state
to even contemplate curtailing, a major source of revenue at a time when the Empire was
constantly strapped for hard cash, and a vital crop for the poor farmers of Anatolia’s
mountainous interior—1 but my search raised further questions.
Opium was one of the Empire’s most important exports in terms of both volume and
profit, but Halil Inalcik and Donald Quataert’s An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman
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Empire, 1300-1914, a great work of scholarship and a first-class reference work, makes only
passing references to it and only in an import-export context, only as an entry on a table denoting
the value of exports or the types of goods that the Empire exported.2 Opium was not just a trade
good, however, not just a commodity like wheat or rice, which the Ottomans also exported.
Opium, to my mind, was something more. Opium is a narcotic and must likely, if substantially
grown in the Empire, which it was, have had some kind of effect on the social history of the
Empire. Opium would have had to have internal consumers as well as producers. Those
consumers, I felt, might have had an identity as consumers, or might have been assigned one by
others at some point. The Ottoman opium user or opium addict might have been stigmatized, and
if so, by whom, and when, and why?
Despite this, Inalcik and Quataert’s two-volume magnum opus on the economic and
social history of the Ottoman Empire omitted the mention of opium almost entirely and
mentioned it only in economic terms, not social. This is not by any means unique to their work.
As Julia Clancy Smith points out, illegal activities and trade, a category which includes narcotics
within it, are all too often relegated to the history of crime or of medicine, neatly excised from
other histories even when they might have been relevant, perhaps significantly so.3 But, like
medicine, narcotics cut across historical disciplines. They have, and have always had, the
potential to at once delineate and muddle identities of all kinds, whether that be class, culture,
race (from its construction in the early modern era on), religion, sexuality, or any other group
identity. Narcotics exist at the border between the in-group and the out-group, at the moral and
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the immoral, and the study of narcotics and of temperance is in many ways a study of these
borderlands.
As mentioned below, the state of the scholarship on temperance and narcotics in the
Middle East is murky, particularly when compared to the literature on temperance movements
and narcotics in East, South, and Southeast Asia or on Prohibition and the American temperance
movement. Because of this and because of other factors mentioned below, I could not continue to
put myself at more disadvantages. I felt I would have to abandon examining narcotics in the
context of the Ottoman Empire proper and instead focus on a Middle Eastern polity that had an
English-speaking colonial administration for a time in order to maximize my chances of being
able to find usable information. I decided, therefore, to focus my thesis on Egypt during the
British occupation (1882-1952). This work does not cover all of that time, however, focusing
mainly on the period 1882-1920, with a notable exception made for an important event that took
place in 1925. This periodization is not arbitrary. These four decades roughly coincide with the
apex of the global temperance movement’s momentum and influence, and this periodization
roughly concludes with the beginning of Prohibition in the United States and the change of
narcotic consumption habits in Egypt. Opium and hashish, known as “black drugs” and grown
and consumed in Egypt for centuries, lost popularity to the imported, processed “white drugs” of
cocaine and heroin after the First World War. 4
This thesis was written over the 2020-2021 academic year, during the Covid-19 pandemic.
Physical archives, which can be vital to historical research, were therefore off-limits during the
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construction of this thesis. Many institutions have, given this context, made efforts to either start
or speed up digitization of their collections, but unfortunately at the time of writing few archives
had digitized copies of primary sources that appeared relevant to this thesis.
Additionally, temperance in the Middle East in the late 19th and early 20th centuries is an
incredibly understudied subfield, at least in English-language academia. Missionaries in Egypt
are, through the innovative work of Heather J. Sharkey and Beth Baron especially, being
increasingly well-served by academia, particularly as regards education and their construction of
physical institutions. There is very little literature on missionary attitudes to narcotics and
temperance, however, which is somewhat surprising given the historical context of the
missionary movement and the narcotics temperance movement (discussed in Chapter 2).
Scholarly literature on the effendiyya (discussed chapter 4) has also undergone a spectacular
flourishing in recent years, but, with the notable exceptions of Liat Kozma and Omar D. Foda,
little attention has been paid to their interactions with temperance, particularly during the period
this thesis focuses on (1882- circa 1920, or 1882-1925, depending on one’s viewpoint). This is a
trend that seems to, hopefully, be abating: Foda and Kozma’s work on the subject, along with the
work of Samir Boulos, whose discussion of missionary temperance is, though brief, invaluable,
have all been written in the past decade, and it is hoped that this may be the beginning of a
historiographical trend.
Researching and writing this thesis presented me with other challenges as regards sources. I am
unfortunately, due to my lack of language skills, limited to English-language sources. This,
combined with my lack of access to physical archives and the embryonic state of

5

English-language academic writing on temperance and narcotics in the Middle East during the
late 19th and early 20th centuries, severely limited the pool of sources, both primary and
secondary, that I was able to draw on over the course of writing and researching this thesis.
Because of this, this paper unfortunately uses very few primary sources, most of which are
drawn from other scholars’ works, there are points in which this thesis uses relatively few
secondary sources, and there are even occasional points where this thesis commits the cardinal
sin of citing a source from a secondary source.
As such, this thesis is necessarily limited and flawed in many ways, and there may, at points, be
too much speculation in it. I do, however, hope that this thesis contributes to deepening scholarly
conversation on temperance in the Middle East. By attempting to compare missionaries,
effendiyya, and Azharis in Egypt with medieval Muslim jurists and situating them all within a
framework of temperance and the shared ambition of the construction of a moral, ‘modern’
Egypt, it is hoped that we may better understand how these actors related to one another and,
therefore, why temperance at once faded globally and left the complex legacy—in Egypt, the
Middle East, and the world as a whole—that it did.
Chapter One briefly discusses the agricultural history of opium and cannabis in general
and in Egypt and the Levant in particular as well as discussing medieval Muslim discourses on
intoxicants in general and hashish in particular. This chapter introduces the three rhetorics of
class, mental health, and sexual morality that are returned to in Chapter Four and in the
conclusion. Chapter Two discusses the American history and international context of narcotic
temperance and the international conferences which led to the current status quo of narcotic
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prohibition over much of the globe. It provides context for understanding the rhetorics of and
motives behind the actions of the three groups which this thesis studies. Chapter Three focuses
on English-speaking missionaries in Egypt, especially American missionaries. This chapter
attempts to give context to missionary efforts on—and interest in—temperance in Egypt. Chapter
Four introduces the other groups at the core of this thesis, the effendiyya and the reformist
Azharis. This chapter aims to give context to how these groups interacted in the context of
temperance, compares their discourses of temperance to each other and to the medieval jurists
discussed in Chapter One, and discusses their aims in attempting to advance temperance in
Egypt. Finally, this thesis concludes with a discussion of why it is that these groups are and can
be compared to each other given their differences, why they are compared in the framework of
the three discourses articulated in Chapter One, and why the temperance movement and moment
died away during and after the 1920s.
A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY
“Cannabis”, in the context of this thesis, refers only to plants of the genus Cannabis and
is not used identically to the term “hashish” in this paper. Franz Rosenthal, this thesis’ main
source on medieval cannabis discourse, attempted to single out specific discussion of cannabis
products from other plant-derived intoxicants such as opium or henbane in his book, but in some
ways this was an impossible task and he openly acknowledged it as such.5 As can be seen from
the fact that they were still categorized together within the rubric of “black drugs” in Egypt
during the period of this thesis, opium and cannabis, and their respective narcotic products,
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maintained some degree of a lack of semantic differentiation even during a period where
categorization began to become a norm. As such, the reader may at times find it more helpful to
read this thesis’ use of “hashish” as “cannabis and other plant-based intoxicants” or “cannabis
and opium” instead. Additionally, Egypt was and is majority-Sunni, and the vast majority of the
jurists discussed by Hallaq and Rosenthal were as well. This thesis does not focus on Shiite
Islam and, therefore, most if not all references to “Islam” or “Muslims” in this thesis may be
taken to read “Sunni Islam” or “Sunni Muslims”.
CHAPTER ONE: BLACK DRUGS IN THE MUSLIM WORLD, FROM ANTIQUITY TO
THE MEDIEVAL PERIOD
Opium has been present and consumed in Egypt and the Levant since Antiquity. The
opium poppy was likely first cultivated “during the sixth millennium BC in the Western
Mediterranean”. It then spread “to the rest of the continent”, reaching “north-west Europe by the
end of the sixth millennium”, where it may have been used for medical, spiritual, and/or leisure
purposes.6 Sumerians cultivated the juice of the opium poppy around 4500 BCE and Egyptians
cultivated opium for both its narcotic properties and for medical use from at least 3000 BCE.7
Tombs from the Eighteenth Dynasty (1550-1350 BCE) contained artifacts with prominent
depictions of what is undoubtedly the opium poppy, as did a site in Syria of approximately
similar vintage.8 Clearly, then, the poppy was not merely an aesthetic fascination of the Egyptian
6
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upper class but had a leisure, spiritual, or medical usage. Artworks depicting poppies and
hundreds of containers dating back to Antiquity that once held crude opium have been found in
Egypt and the Levant,9 part of a trading system that may have been centered on Cyprus.10
Cannabis is of similar vintage in the region. The plant has yet older roots in Central and
Eastern Asia, as well as what is now Siberia, but it reached Egypt by at least the 14th century
BCE (and perhaps far earlier). The tombs of Akhenaten and Rameses II both contain traces of
the plant (hemp fragments in Akhenaten’s case, cannabis pollen in Rameses’ case). 11 Its use
appears to have been largely medical and sartorial in nature, though the varietals that grew in the
area would have contained a fairly large amount of tetrahydrocannabinol (commonly shortened
to THC), the chief psychoactive component of the plant, and the evidence for a primarily
medical use is contested.12 Certainly, by the time of Herodotus (the mid-fifth century BCE), at
least one society most definitely used cannabis for spiritual or leisure purposes. The Scythians, a
steppe people, purified themselves after funerals by “set[ting] up three poles leaning together to a
point, cover[ing] them over with woolen mats… mak[ing] a pit in the center beneath the poles
and the mats”, which they threw hot stones into. The Scythians “then took the seed of this hemp
and, creeping under the mats… throw it on the red-hot stones”, where it “smolders and sends
forth so much steam that no Greek vapor-bath could surpass it”. The Scythians frequently availed
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themselves of this practice, “howling in their joy” at the cannabis smoke.13 Archaeological
evidence seems to confirm Herodotus’ veracity on this subject.14
The ambiguity lessens during the era of the Ptolemies and the Romans, however, as
“[a]wareness of [c]annabis’s medicinal value shifted from Egyptian through Arabic and then to
Greek and Roman medical traditions”.15 The tradition of cannabis use persisted through Arab
medicine before Islam and later became a fairly important component of the Islamic
pharmacopoeia. Cannabis was used as a diuretic, an anti-emetic, an anti-inflammatory, an
analgesic, an anti-epileptic, and an anti-parasitic16. It was, however, apparently viewed only as a
medicine for several centuries.
Cannabis’ usage as an intoxicant posed theological problems for Muslim scholars. The
Prophet had unequivocally banned the consumption of wine, but whether the Prophetic
injunction extended to other intoxicants—or perhaps all intoxicants altogether (and if so, whether
that ban had exceptions)—was unclear, and a subject of some debate among Muslim jurists. The
principle of qiyas or “analogy” in a juridical context ultimately determined the general consensus
on intoxicants. The reasoning for the Prophet’s specific prohibition of wine was analyzed. Wine
was banned, it was agreed, because it was intoxicating. Therefore, all other substances that
intoxicated as wine did, whether they be other varieties of alcohol or non-alcoholic substances,
were to be prohibited as wine was.17 Cannabis is never mentioned in the Qur’an, and it is not
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referenced in hadiths from the early Islamic period.18 In fact, there seems, bafflingly, to be no
evidence of cannabis being used in any capacity beyond the medical in the Muslim world until
the twelfth or thirteenth century.19 Its usage as an intoxicant seems to have spread from the
eastern frontier of the Islamic world, from the Indian subcontinent, through Persia and
Mesopotamia, to Egypt and the Levant, and even, finally, to the western edge of the Muslim
world, in Spain.20
As recreational usage of cannabis spread, the drug lost its inherent association with
medicine but picked up new associations in the process. Sufis and other mystics who eventually
became subsumed into the broader Sufi identity,21 who most likely were the drivers of much of
recreational cannabis’ westward migration, wholeheartedly embraced cannabis as a devotional
tool,22 claiming it helped them to achieve divine communion. They became generally the most
fervent theological defenders of cannabis’ moral standing (though this was not by any means
unanimous; see Rosenthal 124).
Recreational cannabis in the medieval and early modern Muslim world seems to have
found its largest constituency in the urban poor (though rural peasants were likely consuming it
at similar rates at the time, we have little evidence to substantiate this).23 Hashish was much
easier to make and distribute than wine, and cannabis was a readily available agricultural product
throughout the medieval period in Egypt.24 Cannabis’ production for recreational use was mostly
18
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prohibited, but the production of hemp fabric and cannabis’ theologically and legally-permitted
use as a medicine ensured that the plants remained unmolested enough for large-scale urban
consumption of hashish to remain economically and socially feasible25 (legitimate medicinal uses
also ensured that the opium poppy continued to grow in Egypt through the period and that opium
continued to circulate among the Egyptian masses as a result). al-Badri’s list of extant slang
terms for cannabis also records what occupations the terms were in use among, and nearly all of
the professions were of “the lower and lowest strata of society”.26 One of the three main
recurring themes in the orthodox Islamic criticism of cannabis and hashish users is a criticism of
the drug by its association with the lowest of society, with the rhetoric of class. The many
detractors of hashish criticized the poverty and the “bad moral character” of the users.27 Class
and hashish are a constant; they tangle around each other almost inseparably in this history, and
the archetypal user of hashish for the detractor, no matter the environment in which they were
born and never mind the fact that hashish was “like wine, common to both Zayd and Amr” (that,
in other words, hashish consumers could come from upper socioeconomic strata as well as
lower),28 has been transformed by its use into a pathetic figure, rendered almost subhuman by its
malign powers.
Class is not the only recurring theme in medieval Muslim criticisms of hashish to recur in
this history, though. As important is the rhetoric of mental health. Anti-hashish Muslim writers
persistently associated cannabis with frivolity and superficiality of thought as well as insanity
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and criminal behavior.29 It was thought to remove inhibitions of all kinds, but especially sexual
inhibitions. It is in this way that we find the third constant theme of the medieval anti-hashish
discourse. Cannabis was linked with effeminacy and male same-sex encounters, particularly
passive male sexual activity, and seen as a corruptor of innocent youth into this and other
societally-resented acts.30 Intoxicants were reviled by the vast majority of Muslim jurists not only
because intake meant the temporary loss of control over one’s faculties and the removal of one’s
inhibitions, but also because they believed intoxication, no matter the intoxicant, turned the user
into a fundamentally different person.31 One of Islam’s tenets is the prohibition of self-harm or in
any way damaging the divinely-bestowed human body, and in taking an intoxicant, whether it be
wine or opium or cannabis or something else altogether, the indulger or addict altered and
damaged themselves irrevocably,32 creating not merely a personal but a profound societal ill or
profound societal threat.
Prohibitions of hashish were occasionally mooted by jurists and even occasionally put
into practice by medieval Egyptian rulers, perhaps most notably by the thirteenth-century
Mamluk sultan Baybars (r. 1260-1277), who cracked down on hashish, wine, and prostitution in
Cairo. The campaign, which saw “hashish... thrown on fires, taverns… smashed, brothels torn
down, and offenders severely punished”,33 and which was continued by his successor al-Mansur
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Qalawun (r. 1279-1290),34 nevertheless did not have any sort of particularly lasting effect on
consumption habits. Both after and during this upheaval (which might be characterized less as a
“revival of religious fervor where doctrinal considerations as such determined the government’s
attitude” and more as an outgrowth of “an acute fear [on the part of the secular authorities] that a
potential social evil threatening the welfare of the state might eventually get out of hand”),35
cannabis and opium were still grown semi-covertly in the silty soil of the Nile flood plain. The
poor continued to consume their refined end products. 36
These prohibitions were fundamentally ineffective for several reasons. Firstly, as
discussed above, there were enough legitimate uses for cannabis and opium that the medieval
Egyptian state had great difficulty stopping their cultivation. Secondly, the typical medieval user
of hashish and opium (especially hashish) used them, as Rosenthal points out, fairly asocially.
Urban addicts had a few gathering-places, and small, private hashish parties were not unheard of,
but the disdain that respectable society had towards the addict, as well as the paranoia that
hashish could induce, likely encouraged more solitary recreational drug experiences, which were
obviously harder for the secular authorities to crack down on.37 Thirdly and most fundamentally,
the intoxicants were simply too popular to eradicate. The theological case for the prohibition of
recreational intoxicants was perceived as fairly sound by most orthodox Muslim jurists, but it did
not have much impact on the population as a whole, who apparently managed to reconcile
recreational use of plant-based intoxicants with their religion fairly easily. They did not see the
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use of hashish and opium as immoral and harmful to the person and society in the way that
jurists and some rulers of the period seemed to.
In the face of widespread, discreet intoxication in defiance of strict prohibitions, both
secular and religious authorities seem to have quailed. The various prohibitions on intoxicants
were “fighting a losing battle with the reality of the social environment”, a battle that the jurists
and secular authorities seem to have generally conceded with merely a sigh of resignation
followed by a strange silence,38 an unspoken agreement that hashish (and other non-alcoholic
intoxicants) was “a subject to be treated gingerly and to be bypassed whenever possible”. 39
CHAPTER TWO: PROHIBITION, TEMPERANCE, AND THE ANTI-NARCOTIC
MOVEMENT WORLDWIDE
Evangelical Protestant Christianity has been a vital part of the American story since the
colonial era. Charismatic orators such as John Wesley and Jonathan Edwards preached to rapt,
impassioned audiences in the early 18th century, developing new forms of popular, populist
Christianity which focused more on one’s personal relationship to God than traditional
ceremonies.40 A century later, figures such as Joseph Smith offered up newer visions of
Christianity, ones which encompassed not only one’s personal theological health but society’s,
and explicitly linked the two in their moral visions. Revival meetings and itinerant preachers
spurred an “unparalleled growth in church membership”, “enhanced American Christian
discourses about creating a godly republic”, and “stimulated a wave of social activism that led to
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the foundation of several benevolent societies and missionary organizations”.41 These products of
the Second Great Awakening espoused a patriotic religion, a belief that American Christianity
had a duty to export its values and gifts, to “convert the world to Christianity and democracy”.42
These were Christianities of the white, rural midwestern and northeastern middle class, of the
independent farmer and craftsman living in a rapidly expanding country, and the missionaries
that left America for distant lands in the next century would in large part be the children of those
kinds of people.
Inextricably tied up with the drive to Christianize and democratize the world was the
drive to perfect it in other ways and to purge what ardent believers saw as grave social ills from
both the American and global body politic. One of the most important projects of 19th and early
20th-century American Protestant Christianity was the temperance movement, which sought to
encourage personal abstention and, later, to prohibit the consumption of alcohol.43 Alcohol was
thought by temperance advocates to be “productive of pauperism, degradation, and crime”, 44 a
destroyer of the family and of the morally upstanding citizen. It was consumed by much of
American society generally, but most associated with those segments of society that the white,
largely rural, socially respectable middle-class temperance advocates looked down upon, by the

41

Mehmet Ali Doǧan, “From New England into New Lands: The Beginning of a Long Story,” in American
Missionaries and the Middle East: Foundational Encounters, ed. Mehmet Ali Doǧan and Heather J. Sharkey (Salt
Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2011), 5.
42
Robert D. Linder, “Division in Unity: The Paradox of Christianity in America,” in Dictionary of Christianity in
America, ed. Daniel G. Reid (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1990), 9. quoted in Doǧan, “New Lands”,
5.
43
James R. Rohrer, “The Origins of the Temperance Movement: A Reinterpretation,” Journal of American Studies
24 no. 2 (Aug. 1990): 234. Accessed May 5, 2021. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27555317
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0021875800029753
44
Louis A. Banks, The Lincoln Legion: Its Founder and Forerunners...Illustrated with Drawings by Arthur I. Keller
and Photographs (New York: The Mershon Company, 1903), 45. Accessed May 5, 2021.
https://hdl.handle.net/2027/yale.39002002909837

16

urban working class and immigrants of varying colors and creeds.45 The calls for at first,
personal temperance and, later, societal prohibition of alcohol emanating from Dry America
(“dries” being supporters of temperance/Prohibition, as opposed to “wets”) grew and grew until
the Eighteenth Amendment, which banned alcohol production and consumption (with minor
religious exemptions) nationwide was ratified by Congress and the necessary states to make
Prohibition the law of the land on January 16th, 1919.
The temperance cause was transformed from a somewhat stodgy, though reasonably
popular, cause advocated for primarily by rich East Coast merchants and elderly preachers into a
constitutional amendment-passing force by a new, predominantly—though not
exclusively—female generation of activists after the Civil War.46 These activists and their
newly-formed organizations (most notably the Womens’ Christian Temperance Union and the
Anti-Saloon League) exerted pressure on legislatures to make concessions to the temperance
lobby, held rallies, gave speeches, and wrote pamphlets and letters to newspapers.
American Prohibition is a vital part of the temperance story, and certainly the context that
most would associate with the movement. But this is not all that temperance was. Temperance
was a global phenomenon, driven by American (and often British) missionaries, especially
women, wherever they were stationed, and it did not exclusively target alcohol, though alcohol
was often the main target. Internationally, missionaries used the same tactics of ‘moral suasion’
and legislative pressure that brought Prohibition into being to push for global narcotic
prohibition.
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The narcotic prohibition movement was originally spurred by developments in Asia, and
it was inherently connected to the expansion of British and, later, American imperial rule in the
region. In the eighteenth century, the East India Company looked enviously at the opium trade
Portugal was conducting between India and China, and the Company, having gained more
control over Eastern India, was in a position to crowd out the Portuguese and seize the
India-China opium trade for themselves.47 As the Company took over more of the subcontinent,
their poppy cultivation expanded dramatically and ever more opium flowed to China.48
Eventually, the waves of addicts lying broken and dying in the streets and the prospect of all of
China becoming dependent on opium prompted the Chinese Emperor to ban the importation,
sale, and use of the drug and to “[decree] capital punishment for those who smoked or sold
opium” in 1830.49 This, however, did not stop the Company’s opium trade, which merely went
underground, in partnership with smugglers.50
By 1839, the Chinese government could no longer tolerate the smuggling, and it was
willing to make a serious attempt to enforce its prohibition and risk war with the foremost Great
Power of the world, Britain, in order to stem the flow of opium into their ports.51 Commissioner
Lin Zexu’s seizure of opium from British and American merchants at the port of Canton in that
year set the First Opium War into motion, but it also caused a rift between American and British
merchants.
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Both Americans and Britons had made fortunes off of the Chinese opium trade in the
past, including such famous American names as Warren Delano, Jr. (grandfather of President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt) and John Jacob Astor, America’s first multimillionaire.52 When Lin’s
demand that foreign merchants that should “arrive [in a Chinese port] shall never to all eternity
bring any opium: should any ship after this bring it, then her whole cargo on board is to be
confiscated and her people put to death; and that they willingly undergo it as the penalty of their
crime” was made to the foreign merchants docked in Canton, however, the American contingent
shockingly agreed to Lin’s terms (over the objections of the American consul in Canton) while
the British decamped to Hong Kong. Moreover, the Americans “declared their firm opposition to
the opium trade, noting ‘whether we view the subject in a moral and philanthropic light, or
merely as a commercial question, we are extremely desirous to see the importation and
consumption of opium in China at an end’”.53
This remarkable volte-face from the American merchants, many of whom had personally
dealt in opium until Lin’s ultimatum in Canton, was due in large part to the efforts of the first
wave of American missionaries to China and, in particular, one E.C. Bridgman. Bridgman’s
articles, published in both the Missionary Herald, an established missionary periodical, and in
his own missionary periodical focused solely on China, aimed to educate the American public
(or at least the demographic sections of the American public that tended to support missionary
and temperance activities generally) about China in general and the pernicious effects of the
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opium trade in particular.54 Missionaries such as Dr. Peter Parker rallied American public opinion
behind China’s opium policies and lobbied the American government to intervene. Parker failed
in his endeavor but did succeed in convincing President Tyler (governed 1841-45) to crack down
on American smugglers. 55 While the humiliating Chinese defeat in the First Opium War
(1839-42) and the resulting Treaty of Nanking, signed in 1842, allowed Indian opium to stream
into China and once again line British coffers, many Americans had now become cognizant of
the personal and social harm that opium, like alcohol, could wreak and missionaries had
demonstrated that public consciousness-raising and governmental lobbying could be effective at
achieving change.
The issue of opium prohibition, while never quite forgotten in missionary and evangelical
circles, would only truly flare up again in American public discourse at the tail end of the 19th
and the beginning of the 20th century. The Spanish-American War of 1898 left America with new
colonial possessions, transforming the United States from a polity spanning one landmass into a
truly global imperial power. Among these possessions was the Philippine archipelago.
The Spanish colonial government had historically allowed the use of opium in the
Philippines, but had controlled it by instituting the lucrative practice of opium farming, that is,
“auction[ing] off the right to exclusively distribute and sell opium within a proscribed area for a
given time period, leaving it to the ‘farmer’ to enforce his monopoly”.56 When America occupied
the Philippines after the Spanish-American War, however, the opium farm system, a widespread
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practice in colonial Southeast Asia and a vital source of revenue for frequently cash-strapped
colonial governments,57 was scrapped and replaced with a tariff on opium imports.58 The ensuing
high rates of smuggling and loss of opium farm revenue over the next several years, however, led
the American government to consider reinstating the farm system.59
Prior to this, there had been minor, insignificant lobbying efforts among some temperance
advocates seeking to ban opium consumption entirely in the Philippines,60 but the prospect of the
farm system returning left missionaries and temperance advocates in high dudgeon. American
missionaries and evangelicals saw the conquests of 1898 as a golden opportunity to further
purify and Christianize the world, to “make the new [American] empire a Godly one”.61
“Licensing opium”, however, “challenged the whole basis of what missionaries and reformers
saw as the purpose of American colonialism, that is, moral uplift and an example to other
imperial powers”, and “[o]pium smoking sanctioned in the [United States’] most prominent
colony, the Philippines, would undermine the efforts of American evangelicals in their informal
moral empire being established in India, China, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Islands”.62
Allowing a drug considered to be “a greater scourge” and “even more dangerous in the ‘Orient’
than alcohol”63 to prosper in the land that was the grandest symbol of American and evangelical
ambitions could not be brooked.
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This sort of ‘opium Domino Theory’ prompted a furious response from missionaries in
the Philippines as well as, crucially, Dr. Wilbur F. Crafts and his International Reform Bureau, an
organization that lobbied for “important and much-needed legislation along all lines of moral
reform; to defeat immoral legislation; and to arouse interest among good citizens for civic
betterment”64 by “supporting international efforts against drugs, alcohol, gambling, prostitution,
and assorted other vices”.65 The Bureau quickly reached out to its “national network of
similarly-minded churches and lay organizations”,66 sending “circulars and petition forms across
the nation and channel[ing] the thousands of responses to the President”.67
President Theodore Roosevelt, having received substantial support from reformers and
missionaries in his first presidential campaign and facing an election in the near future, walked
back the opium farming plans and decided to appoint a commission, headed by Bishop Charles
H. Brent, an important anti-opium yet non-evangelical Episcopalian missionary to the
Philippines, charged with traveling around East and Southeast Asia and comparing the myriad
systems of opium regulation.68 The end result of the commission’s investigation and the
subsequent political wrangling in Washington was that there would be a three-year period of
transition to total opium prohibition in the Philippines and that the US government would tacitly
“set opium prohibition as a goal of U.S. diplomacy”.69 After decades of relative irrelevance, the
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anti-opium cause had at a stroke secured a remarkable concession and scored a remarkable
victory. Seeing opportunity at long last, anti-opium and anti-narcotic advocates pushed for more.
While evangelicalism never had quite as much sway in Britain as it did in the United
States, the First and Second Great Awakenings (c. 1730-55 and c. 1790-1840) had occurred on
both sides of the Atlantic and British anti-vice and temperance movements accordingly had their
share of adherents.70 In 1906, the decidedly temperance-friendly Liberal government of Henry
Campbell-Bannerman, having secured a commanding electoral mandate, vowed to end the
Sino-Indian opium trade on the grounds of “moral indefensib[ility]” and negotiated an agreement
with China to gradually wind down the trade over a ten-year period as long as China reduced
domestic use and cultivation of opium by similar proportions over the period.71 Seeing this
progress, Bishop Brent wrote to a receptive President Theodore Roosevelt and suggested that an
international conference to discuss global narcotic prohibition should be organized. Britain and
China would not agree to an international conference, which would have legally binding
consequences, but would agree to an international commission to discuss the matter, which was
not binding by nature.72
The Commission was held in Shanghai in February 1909, and it brought together
representatives of thirteen countries, including the Great Powers with eastern interests, but also
countries that produced opium, such as Siam and Persia. The Ottoman Empire, as we have
70
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already discussed, was absent. The intent of the Commission was originally to “ensure that the
phasing out of opium imports according to the arrangements made” in the Ten Year Agreement
“should not lead to their replacement from other sources” and to “help China with the gargantuan
task…of enforcing [its] ban on opium cultivation and smoking throughout the Empire”, and
indeed, that was the Commission’s primary focus. America had very real geopolitical ambitions
in Asia that a diplomatic victory at the Commission would help to promote, namely, providing
“moral and political leadership in the region” and countering Japanese influence.73 However,
between 1909 and 1912, when the Hague Convention met to turn the Commission’s
recommendations into international law, the conversation had expanded far beyond China to take
up a whole new cause altogether: international narcotics control and perhaps even international
narcotics prohibition.74
At Shanghai in 1909, the American delegation, led by Bishop Brent (who also presided
over the Commission, a conspicuous nod to the power and influence of the missionaries), and Dr.
Hamilton Wright, a physician and prominent anti-narcotics campaigner, attempted to secure total
prohibition of smoking opium worldwide, with limited exceptions for medical use and for
phase-out periods in cases where those might become necessary.75 This, however, was
unacceptable to Britain and the other major European powers, who were opposed to ending the
lucrative trade completely or taking significant, substantive steps to slowly close it down.
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The parties to the Commission came away from Shanghai with a few milquetoast
condemnations of the opium trade and support for China’s endeavors to control it, as well as
generalized consideration of opium as a “matter for prohibition or careful regulation” but did not
call for any subsequent binding international convention to follow up those words with action.76
1909 was not a complete failure for the United States or for anti-opium and anti-narcotic
associations, however. America had secured what many viewed as a moral victory against the
continental powers and improved Sino-American relations in the bargain, and the missionaries
had begun to make a case for internal American opium prohibition, which would come to
fruition in the Harrison Act of 1914. 77 America, and the missionary organizations worldwide that
pushed for temperance and prohibition, came away disappointed from the talks, though more
determined than ever to secure some form of global prohibition, and neither had given up on the
idea of an international conference that would purge the world of the evils of narcotics and
spread upstanding, Christian values to peoples they saw as benighted souls.
Part of the success of the renewed wave of missionary anti-narcotic lobbying after 1909
was due to the fact that opium was at this point no longer quite as unique as it used to be.
Newly-developed opium derivatives such as heroin, originally marketed by the German
pharmaceutical manufacturer Bayer as a medicine,78 as well as cocaine, were being used, as
opium had increasingly been over the past several centuries, by both citizens of ‘civilized’ and
‘uncivilized’ nations, though the newer, more highly-processed drugs saw higher initial uptake in
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the so-called ‘civilized’ world. Egypt, a so-called ‘uncivilized nation’, for instance, would only
see heroin and cocaine become drugs of the populace as well as the elite after the First World
War. While rates of addiction to opiates in America actually began to decline after 1896, they,
like alcohol, increasingly became associated with the urban poor and immigrants.79 Like ardent
American Prohibitionists, many European social reformers, especially German reformers,
associated alcohol with the urban poor as well,80 and it is very likely that opiates were beginning
to be seen in the same light in other European countries. The prospect of narcotics afflicting not
only some distant ‘savages’, opening up lucrative new markets for narcotic-producing states in
the process, but also the working-class in the metropole, creating a potential loss of productivity,
a rise in crime, and the perceived accompanying destruction of moral values and creation of
social unrest doubtless served to concentrate the minds of the European governments who
refused to make firm commitments in 1909.
The 1912 International Opium Convention (also known as the Hague Convention, after
its location), the successor to the Shanghai Commission, made binding—or at least appeared to
make binding—a rather sweeping (in comparison to 1909) series of propositions. The production
of raw opium was to be regulated—though not suppressed or reduced—in producing countries,
prepared smoking opium to being “gradual[ly] and effective[ly] suppress[ed]… but set no time
limit within which this suppression [wa]s supposed to be brought about”, provided for the
restriction of opium derivatives and cocaine to “strictly medical and legitimate purposes”, and
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provided a framework for resolution of the opium problem in China.81 Germany, however, which
wished to protect its pharmaceutical industry while still appearing to participate in the
Convention, insisted that the entire Convention’s provisions “would only become valid when
universally recognized”,82 which would delay the Convention’s practical effect—-and stymie the
anti-narcotic movement altogether—-until after WWI ended and the defeated Central Powers
were forced to accept the terms of the Convention by the terms of Article 295 of the Treaty of
Versailles.83
As the world entered the 1920s, however, the many compromises and ambiguities of the
Hague Convention looked increasingly insufficient and outmoded, and yet another Convention
was organized, this time by the new League of Nations, and met in 1924-25, with the goal of
creating a “more comprehensive, enforceable framework for international drug control”.84 The
American delegation, once again featuring Bishop Brent in a leading role and once again backing
a heavily anti-narcotic agenda, this one insisting on global opiate prohibition with immediate
effect, once again clashed with the European Great Powers.The Europeans asserted that, given
the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in China and the resulting lack of control that the new Republic
of China had over many provinces and their opium cultivation, that China had to restore control
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over its territory before a pathway to full global opium prohibition could begin. This resulted in
America and China pulling out of the talks.85
Despite the withdrawal of the American and Chinese delegations, and thus the prospect
of global opium prohibition vanishing, the remaining nations did agree to the straitening of the
Hague Convention in many respects, as well as increasing the variety of substances that would
be prohibited. Curiously, enough, as Liat Kozma points out, the Egyptian delegation to the
1924-25 Geneva Conference proposed, to a largely ignorant crowd of delegates, that hashish was
as or nearly as destructive as opium, and argued accordingly for a prohibition regarding
cannabis, which was not approved given Indian opposition, but did eventually result in the
Convention “prohibit[ing] the export of hemp resins to countries which ha[d] prohibited its use”.
86

Kozma’s article is, as she says, an “attempt to challenge old historiographies which
portrayed European empires as willing agents of addiction in non-Western societies too naïve to
resist”, arguing instead for the centrality of “local merchants, indigenous entrepreneurs, and…
local elites… in the development of drug markets and policies”.87 Kozma makes an extremely
good point in decentering American and European temperance from the story of cannabis
prohibition, and instead emphasizing the role of Egyptian elites, arguing that they acted
independently of imperial interests when engaging in their advocacy for cannabis temperance.
However, Kozma’s analysis, as striking and persuasive as it is, nevertheless undervalues to some
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extent the parallel discourses of—and connections between—-for lack of better terms, “Islamic”
and “Western” temperances/narcotic prohibition movements in creating this Egyptian proposition
for cannabis prohibition at Geneva, bringing it to the attention of the Great Powers, and thus
ultimately the world’s general lack of cannabis legalization in the present day.
Missionaries, who played an extremely important and controversial role in British Egypt
in many different fields, were often close to the very elites that Kozma correctly denotes as
important. Although, as we have just established, they were central to creating and propagating
the “Western” narcotic prohibition movement that produced the Conferences and Commissions,
they are not mentioned in her analysis at all. Our question, then, and the raison d’etre of this
thesis, is to attempt to fill this gap and to inquire how Kozma’s “Egyptian elites”, Protestant
missionaries, and working-class Egyptians interacted with one other within the context of, in
particular, narcotic temperance.
CHAPTER THREE: MISSIONARIES IN EGYPT
In order to examine the intersection of our two temperances, “Islamic” and “Western”,88
in Egypt, we must examine the missionaries who ventured to Egypt during the British occupation
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of 1882-1952 more closely and attempt to understand what kind of changes they instigated and
reactions they provoked, what their place in Egyptian society amounted to, and how they defined
and justified their missions to Egypt. In order to discuss this, we must first understand the
demographic makeup of foreign missions to Egypt.
Egypt had some Catholic missionaries, who had a fairly longstanding historical presence
and who were generally as well-liked by the populace as foreign missionaries could be,89 but
during the British occupation, the vast majority were Protestant. There were a few Germans and
Swedes, but the vast majority of missionaries in Egypt were either British or American. They
represented a variety of different denominations, though most Americans were Presbyterians or
Congregationalists.90 Their doctrinal differences were generally (though, crucially, not always)
set aside while abroad in favor of their shared social attitudes. Organizations such as the Egypt
Inter-Mission Council (founded 1921) showed the desire for missionaries to operate independent
of sect and act as one unit to further their shared goals.91
Protestant missionaries of the period in all contexts, straddling as they did multiple
locales and cultures, naturally had multiple constituencies which they needed to serve. First and
most obviously, they needed to nurture communities of converts to their faith in the country that
they found themselves in, to win the hearts and minds and souls of the peoples they proselytized
to, but they were also accountable to another community. Their coreligionists in their home
country (and sometimes in other countries too; for example, Mary and Margaret Leitch, a
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prominent missionary pair, found much success in fundraising in Scotland as well as America 92)
who put dollars in collection plates and made endowments in their wills to missionary
organizations naturally expected to see souls brought towards salvation for their pains.
In the Middle East, the ultimate goal of the missionary was the mass conversion of local
Muslims to Christianity of whatever denomination the missionary favored, but the laws and
societal pressure that forbade Muslims from converting away from the faith made this a
forbidding task, and on the rare occasions when it happened, tensions between missionaries and
Muslims of all classes spiked. It was considered easier to convert the “indigenous Christians of
the Orient”, who were perceived to be “’nominal Christians’… [who] had become weak under
the pressure of ‘Muslim fanaticism’” and had to be returned to the proper Christian fold.93 In
Egypt, however, Protestant missionaries were largely unsuccessful at converting souls to
Protestantism, despite decades of effort. While missionaries made a few converts, mostly from
the Coptic community, the numbers remained fairly—some would say very—small.94 In order to
keep the money flowing or, viewed in a less cynical light, to continue to promote their vision of
Christianity and civilization in Egypt, missionaries altered their tactics. They founded
orphanages, schools, libraries, hospitals, and universities, some of which survive, in somewhat
altered form, to the present day. Missionaries had more direct impact in Egypt through the
institutions they built and the reactions they provoked than through conversion itself, and that,
whether unconsciously or consciously, was how they justified their work to their domestic
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audience. In the process, they spurred resentment from Egyptian nationalists and religious
conservatives, which would culminate in their expulsion under Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1967.
While the replacement of conversions with institutions was especially true in Egypt,
missionaries in the Middle East and the Maghreb in general were institution-builders of a very
high grade. In many cases, in fact, that was the reason they were allowed to set up missions in
the lands of the Ottoman Empire. In Tunisia, for instance, the state allowed Catholic missionary
organizations to arrive in order to manage the influx of foreign Catholic immigrants, “to minister
to an unruly population over which the beylical state enjoyed little formal legal jurisdiction” and
were viewed essentially as “unpaid social workers and guardians of moral order” by the state.95
Missionaries, through their institutions, were, in short, tasked with “ensuring that families
acquired the rudiments of middle-class sobriety” generally, and were often allowed in
specifically for this purpose.96 While the power of the British government over Egypt goes a long
way towards explaining the persistence of the missionary presence in Egypt, the tangible benefits
of missionary institution-building and the intangible positive moral and cultural influence
effendiyya hoped would filter down to the public at large surely strengthened their position, at
least in elite and governmental circles, to some extent.
Many articles have been written about missionaries’ attempts to reconfigure lives and
society in British Egypt, but few have considered the impact of temperance ideas in any form.
Missionary temperance in the Middle East is a surprisingly understudied phenomenon in general,
and missionary narcotic temperance even more so. The scholarly literature in English is
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extremely fragmentary, and online, readily accessible, useful English-language primary sources
about the period 1880-1920 are rare (the state of the scholarship and sources improves to some
extent when the 1930s and 1940s are considered). An Arabic-speaking scholar with access to
physical archives in America, Britain, and/or Egypt could do some fascinating, pioneering work
in this area, particularly regarding gender and the Egyptian working class (who are especially
neglected by the extant English historiography). But this apologia is too long and flagellatory to
convey a completely accurate picture; we do have some knowledge of how missionaries
interacted with users of alcohol and “black drugs” in Egypt, what they considered to be their
places in society, and the measures they did undertake in their attempt to instil temperance—and
a Western temperance culture, at that—in Egypt.
For Protestant missionaries in Egypt, intemperance was an inherently urban vice, one
which seduced young men from the provinces new to city life (though “drug and alcohol
addiction” was regarded “as a problem that might affect both women and men, young and old”97
), and it was separated, broadly, into two forms. Alcohol, much of it imported from Europe and
America (though arak, made from dates, had been extant in Egypt since long before the British
arrived, and several locally-produced beer companies sprung up during the period in question,
most notably Crown, Pyramid, and Stella),98 was considered one and the same as hashish or
opium in terms of its status as an intoxicant, but, due to its origin in the ‘civilized’ world,
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rhetoric similar to that of the missionary argument for Chinese opium prohibition largely
dominated the discussion of imported alcohol in Egypt. Fears of ‘native races’, ‘noble savages’,
who were, at best, “cultural[ly] [inferior],...passive receptors of everything Western”99 being
corrupted by profiteering, exploitative Westerners ran high in missionary circles, especially so
given that drinking had become especially “prevalent among the official classes and the young
men who have come into contact with Europeans, and who are anxious to imitate what they think
are Western civilized habits and customs... The upper classes, through the presence and example
of Europeans, who nearly all drink in public and in private, are using wines at table, and thus
drinking habits are being formed in our best families, and with the drinking go swearing,
gambling, betting, and other licentiousness”.100
For Protestant missionaries in Egypt, the fact that alcohol by and large seduced and
corrupted the “best families”, the Egyptians who were closest to the missionary project, most
prominent in government, and the rock on which their hopes for ultimate ‘civilization’ and
Christianization of Egypt rested, made alcohol Public Enemy Number One as far as intoxicants
were concerned. Hashish and opium, on the other hand, were largely phenomena of the poor and
were not derived from European or American sources. As such, while both were noted by
missionary prohibitionists, categorized as intoxicants, and fought with similar strategies, alcohol
is mentioned more prominently in some missionary discussions of temperance in Egypt, though
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nearly always in the same breath as other drugs, one of the main missionary temperance
organizations in Egypt actually “mainly concerned itself with intoxicants”101 and it was stressed
that “intemperance in every form” was a danger.102
Missionaries in Egypt concerned with temperance fought alcohol and narcotics in several
ways. Mission schools taught about temperance and encouraged temperance among students,
mission organizations distributed pamphlets in English and Arabic about the dangers of alcohol
and narcotics, set up sanitary hostels “under Christian supervision and with leisure activities”,103
lobbied the British government in London to “secure from [Egypt] the same [total alcohol]
prohibition which the British government has recently [1900] given to the Soudan”,104 and
“wr[o]te letters to prominent officials… as an interest group for the temperance cause”.105
Like the medieval Muslim jurists we encountered in Chapter One, when missionaries
discussed alcohol and narcotics, they stressed the “devastating effects these substances [alcohol
and narcotics] might have on health, but also on the moral and religious integrity of a person.
Therefore, prevention of habits that might threaten health was also regarded as dangerous for the
spiritual life. Hence, the missionaries closely linked body and soul.”106 Due to the perceived
necessity of Egyptians to lead a ‘civilized’ life as well as a Christian in order for the mission to
succeed and the perceived path to Muslim conversion extending through exposure to Christianity
and ‘civilization’, from a missionary perspective the individual issue of temperance was in fact a

101

Foda, “Anna and Ahmad”, 123.
Crafts et al., Native Races, 73.
103
Boulos, “Missionary Spaces”, 153.
104
Crafts, Native Races 74
105
Foda, “Anna and Ahmad”, 122-123.
106
Boulos, “Missionary Spaces”, 154.
102

35

larger, societal issue. The intoxicant’s effect on the part and the whole were intimately
interconnected.
This is not the only striking parallel that we might note between the jurists and the
missionaries. As Samir Boulos points out, while “temperance endeavours were apparently an
inherent part of missionary work in Egypt... they were almost unmentioned in German and
English [the missionary language groups he studied] missionary sources”.107 Missionaries were
great, prolific writers, sending letters and broadsheets all around the world to fellow missionaries
and their compatriots back home, covering all subjects to do with their missions at the most
voluminous length and in the most minute detail, and endlessly lobbying local, colonial, and
homeland authorities for various causes. Despite this, temperance endeavors, which not only
should logically exist but which, on the available evidence, were clearly important in missionary
efforts in Egypt, go almost unmentioned in missionary sources, a subject of some frustration to
both Boulos and this author.
A similar kind of silence to that same, strange unspoken agreement of the medieval
jurists that non-alcoholic intoxicants were “a subject to be treated gingerly and to be bypassed
whenever possible” hangs over us. The looming question, then, is why? What is this missionary
silence? Why does it exist? What qualities does it share with medieval Muslim temperance? Why
does it or does it not extend to other groups in British Egypt such as the effendiyya or the
Azharis? Despite this silence, did missionary temperance endeavors have a clear effect on the
situation on the ground or on other Egyptians’ rhetoric of temperance? Did indigenous Egyptian
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temperance have an effect on the missionaries’ Western temperance, as practiced in Egypt, in
return?
Some of these questions will be answered in the pages to come, some may be answered
in the future by others, and some may never be answered at all. Reckoning with these questions,
however, is crucial to an understanding of just why those Egyptian delegates advocated for a
total global prohibition of hashish quite so vehemently at the Conference of 1925.
CHAPTER FOUR: EGYPTIAN DISCOURSES OF TEMPERANCE
`

Understanding the missionary silence and the actions of the Egyptian delegates to the

Conference in 1925 requires examining non-missionary temperance discourses in Egyptian
society during the British occupation but before the “white drugs” of cocaine and heroin became
widespread in all strata of Egyptian society, around 1920. Broadly, Egyptian discourses of
temperance of the period were prevalent among two important, closely aligned but clearly
defined groups, and the first part of this chapter’s discussion will introduce them.
The first group of importance was the effendiyya (sing. effendi). The effendiyya were a
new class in a nation whose class structure was rapidly changing. From the 1890s, industry had
transformed urban Egyptian labor, creating, in effect, a proletariat similar to that found in
Germany or Britain or the United States during the period, “propertyless wageworkers in
relatively large and modern enterprises...[a class which] gradually acquired consciousness of
itself through its experience of, and resistance to, exploitation and oppression in the workplace”.
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But the effendiyya did not aspire to be part of the new Egyptian working-class, did not

consider themselves to be working-class, and engaged in persistent discursive efforts to
differentiate themselves from and prove themselves superior to the new Egyptian working class
and the extant “traditional al-Azhar trained” upper-class.109 They were urban clerks or
white-collar professionals of one kind or another, oftentimes educated in European or American
universities, who identified as “secular, Western, and elite”,110 preoccupied with the West and
Egypt’s technological and social inferiority and interested in “bridging the intellectual gap
between the West and Egypt”, bringing reform and modernity to what they perceived as a
stagnant society .111
The ways in which the effendiyya asserted and performed their modernity, and, thus, their
position in Egyptian society are crucial to the understanding of temperance in Egypt. Taste and
consumption were significant and deliberate points of differentiation for them. They wore
Western-style clothes, maintained different kinds of households, and read different newspapers.
112

Most interesting is their attitude to temperance, which was strikingly bipolar. In “The Pyramid

and the Crown: The Egyptian Beer Industry from 1897 to 1963”, Omar D. Foda notes many
effendiyya drank alcohol, and that “[a]lcohol served as an ideal commodity for the effendi to
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perform modernity because its consumption achieved a double effect: while linking its Egyptian
drinker to the "modern" European, who drank on social occasions, it separated him from both the
nonelite and the religious Egyptian, who viewed alcohol as socially suspect at best or as religious
anathema at worst...In the case of colonial Egypt, alcohol consumption represented the rejection
of the traditionally trained al-Azhar shaykh in favor of the effendi”.113
The charge of temperance in Egypt, however, was also in large part an effendiyya effort.
The Egyptian delegation to the Conference of 1925 was made up of white-collar Egyptian
professionals who could fairly be classed as effendiyya, while the main non-missionary
temperance organization in Egypt was an essentially effendiyya-operated and
effendiyya-oriented project. The Egyptian Temperance Organization (henceforth referred to as
the ETA or the Association) was a generally “male, middle-class, and Muslim organization” that
sought to “eliminate intoxicants… from Egypt in order to bring it back into line with its proud
Islamic past”.114 The ETA “used Islamic language” in its “arguments for temperance”, but also
“drew inspiration from the latest techno-scientific arguments for temperance”, as well as,
unsurprisingly, “[P]rohibition in the United States”.115 The Association referred to “the fight
against the consumption of intoxicants as a jihad, Egypt as an umma (community), and... the end
of the liquor trade in Egypt as the purification... of the country from the filth... of intoxicants”,
but they also agitated for (and eventually succeeded in mandating) Western ‘scientific’
temperance tracts to be made a mandatory part of the Egyptian national school curriculum”.116
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The ETA’s temperance drive, like the subculture of the alcohol-drinkers Foda mentions in
“The Pyramid and the Crown”, was thoroughly part of the effendiyya project of national societal
reform, but featured heavy influence from Western temperance and Christian missionary and
temperance associations, such as the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union of Egypt. It took
cues, however, not only from the West, but also from the long, rich Islamic tradition of total
temperance (that is, temperance from all intoxicants), and, despite its usage of the rhetoric of
science, modernity, and the West common to the worldview of more secular-identified
effendiyya, could not be said to be wholly secular in nature. The same project of national
renewal and the same passion for Western-identified modernity was shared among the most
fervent beer-drinkers and the most fervent temperance advocates. The dividing line was
secularism.
The work of the ETA was not a blind imitation or simple adaptation of the work of
Western temperance advocates. Rather, as Foda points out, the ETA took pride in the long history
of temperance in Islam and “[b]y linking temperance to the Islamic tradition, the ETA took a
movement that… was very much couched in Christian triumphalism and subverted it so that the
West and Christendom were the ones that needed to catch-up.”117 In other words, effendiyya
temperance was not blind imitation but a syncretic construction. Moreover, the discourses of
effendiyya temperance at once mirrored the discourses of temperance of the medieval Muslim
jurists we discussed in Chapter One and justified the effendiyya’s claim to the uniqueness and
social position of their class.
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We will discuss how exactly this is shortly, but in order to do so, we must consider the
position of our second group of importance, which I will henceforth call the “reformist Azharis”.
The centuries-old mosque-school of the Azhar had produced theologians and leaders for
centuries, with some students coming from as far away as Indonesia to learn.118 In parallel with
and in dialogue with the rise of the effendiyya, however, a new wave of Muslim reformers came
to prominence in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Figures such as Jamal al-Din
al-Afghani (1839-1897), Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935), and Muhammad ‘Abduh
(1849-1905) hit upon similar themes to the effendiyya temperance advocates, but from inside the
institutions of religion itself, and religious revival was for them as crucial as, and intertwined
with, national revival. Their ideas became very influential in the institution that was synonymous
with the Egyptian religious establishment, Egyptian Muslim orthodoxy, and the Egyptian elite in
general, and along with these calls for revival came the call for temperance.
In order to understand the ways in which temperance was advocated for by these
reformist Azharis, we must attempt to understand their ideas and background, and there may be
no better way to do this than to briefly examine the life and ideas of Muhammad ‘Abduh,
perhaps the most prominent, influential, and popular of them all. ‘Abduh was a graduate of the
Azhar and worked as a government censor and as the editor of the official state newspaper before
the British occupation of Egypt.119 In the wake of the ‘Urabi Revolt, which he had supported, and

118

Yuki Shiozaki. "From Mecca to Cairo: Changing Influences on Fatwas in Southeast Asia," in Shaping Global
Islamic Discourses: The Role of Al-Azhar, Al-Madinah and Al-Mustafa, ed. Bano Masooda and Sakurai Keiko
(Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2015): 174. Accessed April 12, 2021.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3366/j.ctt14brz7x.11.
http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9780748696857.003.0008http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3366/j.ctt14brz7x.11..
119
Beth Baron, The Women’s Awakening in Egypt: Culture, Society, and the Press (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2011), 111. Accessed May 3, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt32bph2.

41

the new British occupation, he was exiled from Egypt, splitting his time between France and
Ottoman Lebanon. During this time, he edited another newspaper, this one a pan-Islamist
anti-colonial periodical, with his fervently anti-colonial mentor al-Afghani, but eventually broke
with him out of a newfound belief that “cooperation with Europe would provide better results
than confrontation”.120 He was invited back to Egypt in 1888, technically by the Khedive, but in
reality by Evelyn Baring, the Earl of Cromer, who was, de facto if not de jure, the true ruler of
Egypt.121 Cromer was, despite ‘Abduh’s prior support for the ‘Urabi Revolt and his links with
al-Afghani, impressed by him and appointed him to a series of positions, culminating in the post
of the Grand Mufti of Egypt in 1899.
The office of Grand Mufti was an exceedingly important one. In addition to the judicial
responsibilities of the post, the Muftiship was extremely politically relevant, especially because
the Mufti was responsible for issuing fatwas, that is, formal opinions about the religious
permissibility of a given action, upon request.122 This was a marker of the great trust that Cromer
had in ‘Abduh and the great importance to the British of putting a reformer, someone willing to
take British interests into account and to not stir up anti-colonial sentiment, in the position. As
Grand Mufti, ‘Abduh advocated for various types of religious reform. 'Abduh saw these reforms
as vital to his vision of a 'modern' Islam and a 'modern' Egypt, and the ways in which he
discusses these reforms and connects them with temperance are equally vital to our
understanding of temperance in Egypt and, perhaps, in general.
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‘Abduh, who was at the time123 the Grand Mufti of Egypt, wrote about the “necessity of
religious reform” which would allow graduates of the Azhar to “explain to the Egyptians that
they constitute[d] one physical entity; every organ works for the benefit of all and the suffering
of one organ is the suffering of all”, to “fight immoral behavior” and to be “responsible to the
poor worker who spends his earnings on cocaine, opium, hashish, wine, and other dangerous
drugs”.124 The agents of ‘Abduh’s reform movement would “save those who are wounded by
these dangerous sicknesses and murderous vices like wine, gambling, and drugs”, and by so
doing would “produce in the nation what no group would be able to do… build[ing[ morality in
the nation and educat[ing] its souls”.125
The moral and societal project that was considered necessary to be built by the reformist
Azharis and temperance-advocating effendiyya carried with it certain resonances. ‘Abduh’s
rhetoric of religious reform is couched in terms of the welfare of the poorest of Egyptian society,
and of Egyptian society more generally, but it is also strongly paternalistic. ‘Abduh’s
working-class Egyptians are here portrayed as assailed on all sides by vice and intoxicants which
eat away at not only their earthly prospects and not only their souls, but at the body politic more
generally. They are incapable of fighting these ills on their own, of educating themselves, and
require the guiding hand of a beneficent moral, religio-scientific elite to build temperance,
morality, and modernity.
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There is a term, used earlier, which is rather loaded. The term in question is “orthodoxy”.
It is used in this context because of how ‘Abduh treats temperance and in what context he
discusses it. ‘Abduh’s project of religious reformation and his proposed elite are faced with
defeating what he terms “innovations and superstitions” that detract from the truth and vitality of
Islam in its original virtuous state.126 In particular, he cites the Sufis as bringers of harmful,
irrational ideas and devotes a substantial portion of his tract to attempting to counter their
arguments. Given the longstanding association of Sufis with hashish, their presence here may be
no accident, but there is a more important reason for that juxtaposition and for my use of the
word “orthodoxy” in this context. ‘Abduh’s discussion of religious reform and temperance shows
his attempt to enshrine his theological bent as orthodoxy in Egypt, to cement the worldview of
his class, and of his particular vision of reform, as the legitimate, unchallenged religious
authority of Egypt and as the fulcrum upon which his ideal of an Egypt that was an “example to
be followed in the Orient”127 was to be built. Sufi orders and Sufi theological thought are, for
‘Abduh, immoral because they are not productive and not productive because they are not
modern. This conjunction of morality, productivity, and modernity in the interest of building a
more moral society is at the root of ‘Abduh’s linkage of temperance and religious reform, and it
is the context in which we must consider temperance rhetoric in—and out— of Egypt.
Into this framework, we may fit the three discourses of temperance that we discussed in
Chapter One, that of class, mental health, and sexual/gendered morality. We may attempt to
compare the ways in which organizations such as the ETA and the Egyptian delegates to the
Convention attempted to build a distinctively Egyptian temperance identity and to assert their
126
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modernity to the attempts of medieval Muslim jurists to build a purer society to the efforts of
Protestant missionaries to evangelize Muslim Egypt through temperance and civilizational
rhetoric. This ‘discourse-matching’ and discursive analysis of temperance rhetoric allows us,
perhaps, to understand why temperance ideas and movements died away in Egypt as they did in
America and around the globe but left the legacy behind that they did, and why missionaries in
Egypt were so silent about their temperance efforts.
Expressed in ‘Abduh’s work, we see an echo of our medieval jurists’ rhetoric of class in
discussing the effects of hashish on the individual and on society. If, however, the medieval
addict existed in a sort of class of their own below standard social classes, hashish seen to be
“bring[ing] the addict down to a level where nothing remains in him… combin[ing] all the
qualities that negate the existence of a well-ordered society”,128 ‘Abduh’s addicts, in contrast, are
identified with a particular class, the new Egyptian proletariat. His addicts are equally lacking in
agency and far from the top of the social ladder, far, too, from the type of citizens that make a
‘moral nation’ or a ‘well-ordered society’, but they are nonetheless productive or potentially
productive citizens, workers, who could be more productive and more virtuous citizens if they
had guidance from ‘Abduh’s mooted guardians of morality, not strung-out no-hopers wasting
away in an alley, far from even heavenly salvation. Nevertheless, ‘Abduh’s discourse of class
continues the tradition of linking intoxicant usage to the lower classes, deeming it—and vice
generally — a societal ill of the urban poor which needed to be corrected and seemingly
absolving the rich and the new upwardly-mobile effendiyya ‘middle class’ of any part in the
perceived current moral turpitude and decrepitude of Egyptian society (though assigning them a
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role in his reform movement). ‘Abduh’s temperance rhetoric also draws a clear dividing line
between the worker and everyone else.
Effendiyya temperance’s relationship with the discourse of class is similarly comparable
to the class discourse as expressed by the medieval jurists, though, like that of ‘Abduh and the
reformist Azharis, not identical. Like ‘Abduh, too, theirs was concerned with class in the context
of productivity as well as the evils that intoxicants and general vice brought on society, the
nation, and the individual per se. As Kozma points out, the effendiyya saw the 1879 ban on
hashish as “part of a civilizing process” that could tame the “lower classes”, a “crowd that should
be disciplined into rationality”.129 This ‘crowd’ was perceived by the effendiyya as lazy, whiling
away their days in cafes, drinking coffee and consuming hashish, all while their time could be
put to the more productive use of industrial labor. For the effendiyya, national progress and their
national civilizing mission required the transformation of the Egyptian poor into Western-style
proletarians, and intoxicants were a major obstacle to this process. The “black drugs” of hashish
and opium were a “symptom of Egypt’s moral degradation” that made the Egyptian worker—
and, by extension, Egypt— stagnate, “sit[ting] idly all day like women”, while the West
advanced.130
As we have seen in a previous chapter, temperance in missionary rhetoric in Egypt was
tied up with class as well to some extent, though one that diverged significantly from the
discourse of class of the medieval jurists, effendiyya, and reformist Azharis. As we have seen,
American temperance (and Western temperance as a whole) was inherently classist, relying as it
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did on paternalism and hatred on the part of rural, middle and upper-middle-class Americans
towards the urban poor. Missionary temperance in Egypt, however, seemed directly concerned
less with the control of the lower classes that Western temperance advocates were preoccupied
with in their home countries and that the effendiyya and reformist Azharis were preoccupied
with in Egypt.
While figures like ‘Abduh emphasized class uniqueness and the role that the upper
classes could play in building a new, modern Egypt by uplifting and morally enlightening the
lower classes, serving as positive role models, missionaries in Egypt worried about the resistance
to vice of the upper classes themselves and of their potential to be negative role models of
temperance in Egypt. If their ‘civilized’ elite, the ‘best families’ of Egypt, were habitual alcohol
drinkers or gamblers or brothel-goers or heroin or cocaine addicts, how could they truly be said
to be civilized at all? Why would ‘civilization’ be attractive to a working-class Muslim
Egyptian? If ‘civilization’ wasn’t attractive, why would Protestant Christianity be? If Protestant
Christianity appeared ultimately unattractive, if the total conversion of Egypt for Christ appeared
ultimately impossible, why should congregants back home or missionaries seeking to go abroad
devote time and resources to Egypt at all? Like the effendiyya and the reformist Azharis,
missionaries had a natural interest in delineating the elite from the masses, of viewing intoxicants
as a disease of the working class, curable by exposure to ‘civilization’ and modernity in the form
of the effendiyya and reformist Azharis, and an obstacle to creating their vision of a civilized,
modern, Protestant Egypt. In order to control the poor, the missionary temperance endeavor had
to first control the elite.

47

Another discourse of the period which had parallels in the medieval jurists’ discourses of
temperance is the discourse of mental health. The twin associations of the addict with, on the one
hand, unseriousness, laziness, and undue frivolity and insanity and criminality on the other found
purchase in effendiyya temperance rhetoric. Hashish’s impact on mental health was strongly
linked to their class and national project and followed these two throughlines. The inebriation
and the delirium that black drugs produced was, from the perspective of the effendiyya, a visible
sign of the sluggishness and the archaic, inferior ways that they sought to root out. This, too,
intertwined with the rhetoric of productivity that effendiyya temperance advocates deployed. As
Kozma points out, “[d]isorder, the inability to discipline time, space and mobility rationally, was
becoming a political issue. In this context, the idleness of the hashish smoker and his inability to
control his mind and his time were emblematic of those traits that Egyptian society, and
particularly its lower orders, needed to abandon to serve collective progress”.131 Laziness, for the
effendiyya, was not just the product of a stagnant culture that required reform, but the end
product of the consumption of a narcotic. Their brand of temperance was important because,
from their perspective, lack of hashish consumption among the ‘crowd’ or the ‘lower orders’ or
the ‘workers’ would go quite some ways in and of itself to achieving their goals, to taking the
Egyptian lower classes and making them productive, modern workers.
This is, however, not how the Egyptian delegation, effendiyya all, attempted to justify
their proposed cannabis ban at Geneva. For them, the rhetoric of ‘Oriental indolence’ and
productivity was, though significant, secondary in their relation of mental health and cannabis, at
least on the international stage. Rather more important was the second branch of cannabis/mental
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health discourse, the rhetoric of hashish, insanity, and criminality. Dr. Mohamed El Guindy, the
head of the Egyptian delegation, told the assembled conference-goers that hashish was “a toxic
substance, a poison against which no effective antidote is known”, that it was “the principal
cause of most of the cases of insanity occurring in Egypt”, causing “from 3[0?] to 60 percent of
the total number of cases occurring in Egypt”.132 El Guindy went on to assert that “a ban on
cannabis would contain a threat which was currently plaguing mainly Eastern countries, but
would eventually reach Europe as well”, and “that the effects of hashish addiction and
consumption were comparable to, if not worse than, the effects of opium consumption”, a
narcotic with which most other diplomats at Geneva were naturally much more familiar.133
The attacks on hashish as promoting criminality and insanity, as we have seen in Chapter
One, have deep roots, but the exclusive focus on the issue of insanity and criminality at the
Conference provoke questions. As Kozma points out, domestic effendiyya temperance literature
did characterize hashish addicts as wife-beaters, did say that hashish and opium were
condemning Egyptian society to stagnation by “messing with our brains, destroying our minds”,
134

domestically, the discourse of black drugs sapping productivity seems to have been favored,

while abroad, the discourse of black drugs causing criminal behavior and insanity seems to have
been favored. Both fall under the umbrella of mental health, and both emphasize the destructive

132

Westel W. Willoughby, Opium as an International Problem: The Geneva Conferences, (Baltimore, The Johns
Hopkins Press, 1925), 379. Accessed May 5, 2021. https://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.$b812087 The range of 3-60%
given by Willoughby seems unusual and unlikely to prove what El Guindy was arguing for. Kozma cites El
Guindy’s statistics as referring to between 30-60%, a much more reasonable-sounding figure in the context of this
discussion (see Kozma, “From Local Ban”, 454) It is likely that there was simply a typo in Willoughby’s account.
133
Kozma, “From Local Ban”, 454.
134
Kozma, “From Local Ban”, 447.

49

effects of hashish on the user and society, but there is nevertheless difference between them, and
nevertheless clearly a reason why the rhetoric of insanity was preferred at Geneva.
While convincingly arguing for the reason behind the difference in rhetoric on the
national and international stages is far beyond the scope of the thesis, a little speculation may
help us to understand the motives of the effendiyya in coming to the conference and engaging in
temperance activity in general. The other delegates at the conference may have, coming as they
did largely from countries that had a significant industrial base already and thus no need to build
workers out of the lower-classes, been less interested in the rhetoric of productivity and more
worried about the medical and judiciary expenses and possibility for violent revolt that an
increase of insanity and criminality might provoke. Regardless of the motivation for couching
their attack on hashish in these terms, it is clear that the effendiyya picked their rhetoric and their
target carefully, and ultimately that is what is most important.
The black drugs united the effendiyya in condemnation. If alcohol exposed a faultline
between the more pious and more secular members of the effendiyya due to its ability to allow
them to assert one’s secularism and admiration of all things European in its consumption while at
the same time being clearly religiously prohibited, opium and hashish served as perfect symbols
of Egypt’s woes, of its ‘Oriental decadence’. It provided the perfect opportunity for all
effendiyya, regardless of their degree of piety, to assert their modernity and class position in
rejecting it. We have seen how this was done on a national level, through temperance efforts, but
Geneva serves as a salutary example as well, from a more international perspective. The
effendiyya attempted to solidify their claim to expertise and modernity by citing the work of
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British colonial doctors (most notably Dr. John Warnock, “medical director of the Egyptian
hospital for the insane in the 1890s and 1900s”),135 identifying a fear and a rhetoric that at once
had deep local roots and could resonate with other diplomatic delegations, and giving those fears
a scientific frame of reference other diplomats could understand (i.e. comparing hashish, an
unknown, to opium, a known, and couching their advocacy in statistics and reports).
In short, the rhetoric of mental health in all its permutations in effendiyya temperance
efforts was useful nationally because it allowed for temperance-inclined effendiyya to present
themselves as a sort of parallel to reformist Azharis like ‘Abduh, as guardians of the worker’s
and the nation’s mental—rather than moral or religious—health. On the international stage,
mental health was a discourse that allowed for the effendiyya to assert their uniqueness,
importance, and modernity through advocacy, allowed them to show themselves not in blind
assent to Western experts and ideas but as innovators in genuine dialogue with them. Because of
this, the rhetoric of mental health was perhaps more prominent among effendiyya temperance
advocates than among missionary temperance advocates in Egypt or the reformist Azharis.
Missionary temperance pamphlets such as the one cited by Samir Boulos in his “Cultural
Entanglements and Missionary Spaces: European Evangelicals in Egypt (1900-1956)” and
produced by the Women’s Christian Temperance Union of Egypt (incidentally the same
organization that Foda focuses on as representative of missionary temperance in Egypt) do
occasionally seem to mention mental health, but it seems to mainly have been done in relation to
the discourse of mental health and productivity. While alcohol temperance in an American
context frequently stressed the deleterious effects alcohol had on crime (particularly domestic
135
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violence)136 and insanity rates,137 missionary temperance in Egypt apparently tended to focus
more on the weakness, both physically and mentally, that the black drugs supposedly provoked.
Boulos’ quoted pamphlet, albeit dating a little outside our period (1927), demonstrates this very
well. The pamphlet tells the story of a boy named Muhammad who became addicted to hashish,
as a result of which “his small body grew thin and his face that was already pale became even
paler. His face [...] appeared like the face of an old man, ravaged by the days, since this is the
effect of this drug on the human body. It fully absorbs the strength of body, destroys the strength
of will and spoils his heart. Even if he is in the bloom of his youth he becomes unfairly weak like
the tree that is infected by vermin and is only suitable to burn.”138
If the effendiyya and the missionaries were using the same discourse of mental health and
temperance in practically the same way in Egypt, but neither were using the discourse of mental
health/productivity outside of Egypt to the same extent, this particular form of the discourse must
have had, or have been perceived to have, some shared attraction to some audience both the
effendiyya and the missionaries were interested in reaching.139 The pamphlet mentioned above
was explicitly written “for a young audience”, for boys and girls in missionary-run schools.140
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While some mission schools in Egypt operated with the education of lower-class children
specifically in mind141 and many had a mix of students from various social classes,142 most,
particularly schools in urban areas, had an enrollment of predominantly middle and upper-class
families.143
Mission schools were vital to the missionary effort in Egypt and had the twin goals of
driving direct conversions, which was largely unsuccessful in Egypt, as we have discussed
previously, and inculcating children who were friendly to the missionary enterprise and adopted
missionary mores. Regardless of religion. missionary schools in the period generally were quite
religiously diverse. Christians, Muslims, and Jews all attended missionary schools, and they were
generally not directly preached at when doing so.144 The logic behind why their temperance
discourses targeted to these children discussed the black drugs’ effect on mental health in terms
of personal productivity and health instead of insanity is likely twofold. Firstly and more
obviously, children in general may find discussions of insanity and crime statistics less relevant
to their daily lives and less potent a motivator in abstaining from alcohol and substances than
imagining drastic personal physical and mental decline. Secondly, however, the pupils at mission
schools were by and large children of the elite, being reared to be the elite of the future. Their
parents could well have been effendiyya, already preoccupied with industrial and scientific
productivity and building a modern Egypt on those foundations, but, as we have seen, not all
abstainers from alcohol or other vices. Missionaries could well have hoped to educate the parents
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as well as the children by couching their attacks on alcohol and substances in the already-extant
rhetoric of productivity, hoping to ultimately ‘civilize’ Egypt in their image through ‘civilizing’
those that were already inclined to be receptive to their message.145
Having discussed our two discourses of temperance, we now turn to our third, that of
sexual morality and gender. As we have seen in Chapter One, medieval Muslim jurists tended to
associate intoxicants, and especially hashish, with sexual licentiousness, male same-sex
encounters, and effeminacy. This discourse too is found in Egypt during this period, discussed by
our three groups. Like our other discourses, it is not paralleled in every aspect, but a large
amount of intersection and/or inspiration exists between them. The most obvious point of
difference is that of explicit male homosexuality. No English-language source found during the
research process for this thesis, whether it be missionary, effendi, or Azhari, discussed same-sex
activities or identities in the direct context or resulting from the consumption of opium, cannabis,
alcohol, or any other intoxicant. This being said, it may behoove us to examine how the black
drugs and sexual morality seem to have been perceived to have intersected in Egypt during the
period.
Broadly, the discourse of sexual morality was, like the discourse of mental health,
distinctly two-pronged. One prong has to do with the effeminacy hashish (and, perhaps, opium as
well) was seen to have provoked and the other is more generalized, relating to prostitution,
though the two are more related than they may initially appear.
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We have already seen, earlier in this chapter, a piece of effendiyya temperance rhetoric
which castigated hashish users for “sit[ting] idly all day like women”. This equating of intoxicant
usage, effeminacy, and laziness is nothing new, as we saw in Chapter One. Egypt during this
period was a society that seemed newly “fear[ful] of blurring the lines between femininity and
masculinity and between heterosexuality and homosexuality, as well as the collapse of social
codes for decent behaviour in public”.146 Wedding dancers who had routinely blurred and
subverted gender norms in their performances for centuries were being newly suppressed and
oppressed by the Cairo police.147 Many advocates of a ‘modern Egypt’ associated that modernity
and progress with a rigid gender binary and logically likely associated people who flaunted that
binary, particularly men who embraced femininity, or who had sex with men, with laziness,
cultural stagnation, and with intoxicants. Temperance was a totalizing drive, and its targets
necessarily had to be seen as linked. Prostitution seems to provide another salutary example of
this fact.
For many Azharis and effendiyya temperance advocates, prostitutes, much like the black
drugs, were seen as “ a leading symbol of decadence, social decay, urbanisation and
exploitation.... Commercial sex… came to dramatise the plight of the beleaguered nation.
Activists saw sex workers as a danger to the social order of the ‘virtuous nation’.”148 Unlike the
black drugs, however, prostitution was seen by most abolitioniststo be an inherently
British-derived issue, and was used in an anti-colonial rhetorical context, generally advocating

146

Hanan Hammad, “Regulating Sexuality: The Colonial–National Struggle over Prostitution after the British
Invasion of Egypt," in The Long 1890s in Egypt: Colonial Quiescence, Subterranean Resistance, ed. Marilyn Booth
and Anthony Corman (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), 210. Accessed April 26, 2021.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3366/j.ctt14brz4c.12.
147
Corsair, The Near East 11, no. 261 (May-Oct 1916), 206. https://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101064073370.
148
Hammad, “Regulating Sexuality”, 196, 202.

55

for the suppression of prostitution as opposed to the system of regulation that the British
enforced.149 ‘Abduh, however, who tended towards less overtly anti-colonial rhetorics of
modernism and national revival, saw prostitution as a social disease and a cancer on the Egyptian
body politic, but one that was ultimately curable by marriage, which would take shiftless men
and convert them into morally upright, “healthy and productive citizens”, ready to abstain from
vices and intoxicants of all kinds.150 The rhetoric of prostitution was really part of a broader
agitation and temperance fervor against vice in Egypt, which encompassed sex work and the
black drugs, but also gambling and alcohol, and which was prosecuted by all three of our
discussed groups. Each group had two classes whose attitude to vice concerned it. For the
temperance-inclined effendiyya, it was their own class and the poor. The reformist Azharis also
were interested in their own class and the poor. The missionaries were interested in the
effendiyya and the poor.
Each group, as we have discussed, was concerned with the ultimate moral uplift and the
‘modernization’ of Egyptian society, which required the elimination of vice and the promotion of
science—sometimes pseudo-science—and productivity. In order for any of these groups’
ambitions to be realized, the poor had to be uplifted, and in order for that to happen, an example
had to be set. Azharis who gambled or smoked opium discredited religious authority in the eyes
of many; effendiyya who drank or visited prostitutes discredited ‘modern ways’ in the same
fashion. Even if those classes did set moral examples, if the poor chose to refuse to accept these
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groups’ visions and continue living as they had before, those ‘modern ways’ would necessarily
be discredited to some extent. The story of Egyptian temperance is the story of that discrediting
and of temperance’s failure on the national stage, but its fairly longstanding success
internationally as regards narcotic prohibition and prohibitions of other kinds of out-group
activities or identities.

CONCLUSION: POINTS OF CONVERGENCE AND THE LEGACY OF THE
TEMPERANCE MOMENT
In order to conclude this thesis, it is necessary to, depending on one’s point of view,
either correct a possible misunderstanding or confess a lie. This thesis is not fundamentally about
Egypt. This thesis is not fundamentally about the “black drugs” of hashish and opium in Egypt
from 1882-1920/5. This thesis is not about “Islamic temperance” and “Western temperance” or
how those two streams of temperance differed or blended to create a distinctively Egyptian
temperance.151 The fundamental point of this thesis, in fact, is that these two distinct ways of
framing temperance are, though perhaps accurate, not altogether useful, that these two streams
are tributaries flowing from the same river, that these temperances arose out of shared needs by
similar groups who had similar priorities. This thesis is ultimately about four groups—the
medieval jurists discussed in Chapter One; the predominantly American temperance advocates
and missionaries who brought the ‘Western temperance’ style to Egypt, discussed in Chapter
Two and Chapter Three; the effendiyya, and the reformist Azharis, both discussed in Chapter
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Four— that shared, despite their differences in time period, cultural upbringing, and degrees of
religiosity, fundamental commonalities. This thesis is about those commonalities, about why it is
possible to reasonably compare these groups at all and why our framework of the three
discourses of class, mental health, and sexual morality is, as this thesis argues, valid.
Our four groups all sought to reorder society to create new, more moral, societies and saw
temperance as vital to this goal. In attempting to achieve their visions for these new worlds, they
sought to not only cement and define the relevance of their class, to acquire cultural power, but
to do so through cementing the moral worldview of their class over society as a whole and over
groups that they considered immoral in general.152 In so doing, they used the same rhetoric and
ways of framing and objecting to substances, activities, and ways of being that they found
immoral. In their drive to eliminate all of these behaviors and build their ideal societies, they
connected them, made their reform visions total. They set their temperances against all forms of
the things they saw as vice in the name of productivity, morality, and, in the case of our
nineteenth and twentieth-century actors, modernity (which was for them, as we have seen, just a
more complicated framework for expressing the same dichotomy of the moral and immoral153). It
is because of this that we cannot talk about a “Western temperance” and “Islamic temperance” as
truly separate frames of reference. While a shared Abrahamic tradition likely informed some of

152

It should be noted that this rather cynical-seeming motivation is not the only reason these groups militated
against the things they found immoral. Humans remain humans across time and space, and genuine moral feeling
and a genuine desire to help those who these groups felt strayed from a moral path doubtless played a significant
role in these movements.
153
The effendiyya’s morality, after all, was built on productivity, nation-building, and emulation of perceived
Western modernity; anything that was seen as hampering those efforts was immoral by definition. The same could
broadly be said for the reformist Azharis, to perhaps a slightly more limited extent. The missionaries’ morality was
similarly reliant on perceived notions of Western modernity, Western productivity, and Western civilizational and
religious superiority. Here, too, anything perceived to be antithetical to activities they saw as promoting those
notions was at once immoral and non-modern.

58

the choices of targets of these temperance movements (e.g. prostitution and people who did not
conform to the gender binary or the sexual binary), the reason these groups all used the same
discourses they did and chose the many similar targets that they did was a result of convergent
evolution, not some grand cultural or religious inheritance.
The reason for this convergence is important. We have seen how important to group/class
identity the idea of national revival through temperance, in the case of the effendiyya and
reformist Azharis, and global revival through temperance, in the case of the missionaries and
temperance advocates, was. In the case of the medieval jurists, these rhetorics of revival might
not apply per se, but they also connected individual use of intoxicants and the other brands of
vice that they saw as resulting from it to, and construed it as, a societal and religious wound that
they were heavily invested in seeing healed. All our discussed groups put productivity at the core
of their morality, equated the two, and sought to improve productivity/morality by forcing
out-groups, especially the poor, to stop engaging in behaviors that they saw as
immoral/unproductive. Productive citizens, for these groups, fit the definition of able-bodied,
able-minded, conforming to a “modern” (for everyone but the medieval jurists, a word which
might in their case be replaced by “pious”) notion of gender roles and sexuality, and who worked
as they were ordered to. The point this thesis is attempting to make is not that these groups were
necessarily incorrect about the relation of productivity to intoxicant usage (though gender and
sexuality certainly have no bearing on it); a heavy user and addict of, say, alcohol or opium
might well be less able to work than an abstainer. Rather, the point is that productivity was at the
heart of all our groups’ notions of morality and progress, resulting in similar movements and
rhetoric. In placing the production of productivity/modernity/morality among the poor and other

59

out-groups at the core of their identities as a class and at the center of their grand cultural project,
they left themselves unprepared for what might happen if their project failed. If the state could
not be persuaded or coerced into enshrining temperance ideals into law or if, even with the
power of the law behind them, the poor and the heterodox could not be controlled to this extent,
what would that mean for advocates of temperance or, indeed, the classes that spawned
temperance projects?
In Chapter One, we briefly discussed the failure of various medieval anti-vice and
anti-intoxicant campaigns in Egypt and noted that, in the wake of those failures, that
non-alcoholic intoxicants and their mass popular consumption became a subject best avoided.
We also noted a curious ‘missionary silence’ on the part of missionaries in Egypt regarding
temperance activities in Chapter Three. These silences are not accidental, and they come as a
direct result of this centering of temperance as a vital part of class identity. In America,
Prohibition’s complete failure caused global temperance movements to lose saliency and
momentum and led most temperance organizations in America and abroad, including Egypt, to
sink into obscurity.154 In Egypt, not only did temperance activities fail to have a substantial
impact on the opinion of society as a whole or on the workings of the state (the British colonial
government of Egypt never viewed alcohol or the black drugs as a serious problem or banned
prostitution),155 but the dangers of narcotics, both real and imagined, actually grew. As
mentioned before, cocaine and heroin became drugs of the multitudes after the First World War
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(which the British did take seriously).156 Cannabis and opium are still grown, covertly or
otherwise, in Egypt today and still have consumers.157 Given all this, it is not surprising that these
group silences developed. Temperance became an embarrassment and talk of national or
religious revival or global uplifting was generally hard to square with the reality that the world as
a whole was just as vice-filled as it was before and the morals and social positions of the groups
driving temperance just as relevant, or perhaps even less, than they were before.
This is not to say that temperance and other moral movements of the time did not leave a
long legacy; they did. The United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, signed in 1961,
accomplished what the evangelical narcotics temperance advocates of the early 20th century and
the effendiyya could only dream of. The Single Convention added cannabis and opium and all
their derivatives to Schedule I status, making them illegal among all signatories to the
Convention and thus basically worldwide. This arguably could not have happened without the
work of, among many others, F.C. Bridgman in China, Wilbur Crafts in Washington, Charles
Brent at the Shanghai Commission, or Mohamed El Guindy in Geneva, without, in short, these
groups and their attempts to assert their class position and to build moral societies in their own
image. Drugs and other ‘vices’ such as prostitution or LGBTQ+ identities or (in more limited
fashion) gambling had become seen, like they had in Baybars’ day, as threats to the healthy,
productive operation of the modern individual in modern society and thus contrary to the
interests of the state, and this may be the biggest legacy of the temperance movement. In making
productivity central to morality, and rhetorically positioning vices as unified against that
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productivity, temperance failed repeatedly on a national level around the world but succeeded, on
some level and perhaps not permanently, on the international.158 In some ways, our chosen
groups did succeed in imposing their moral visions on the world.
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